This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
Introduction
For decades, obtaining a …rst collective bargaining agreement has been a major hurdle for the US union movement. Ferguson and Kochan (2008) demonstrate that between 1999 and 2004, only 38% of newly certi…ed unions succeeded in reaching such an agreement within one year, and only 56% within two years, thereby con…rming earlier evidence on …rst-contract success rates in the US (e.g. Cooke, 1985) . Reasons for bargaining failure include an immature context of the bargaining relationship, inexperienced negotiators, unrealistic union expectations and a set of both legal and illegal …rm strategies to oppose unionization (Johnson, 2010) . The inherent di¢ culty of resolving …rst collective bargaining agreements leads to greater labor turnover, higher employee dissatisfaction, increased risk of union decerti…cation and the creation of a multi-million dollar industry of consultants and lawyers specialized in stalling negotiations.
To remedy these problems, the US Employee Free Choice Act stipulates that the National Labor Relations Board provides for …rst-contract arbitration (FCA). If negotiations drag on without resolution, the dispute is referred to an arbitration panel empowered to determine a collective …rst agreement which is binding for at least two years. The prospect of a third party making contract decisions incentivizes unions and employers to reach an agreement on their own. Using a panel of ten Canadian jurisdictions that introduced FCA over the period 1976-2005, Johnson (2010) …nds that FCA encourages collective bargaining without resorting to arbitration in the sense that the average likelihood of an imposed contract is only 5%. 1 In addition, FCA reduces work stoppage incidence by at least 50 percent.
However, it remains unclear whether FCA truly contributes to voluntary bargaining rather than forcing the bargaining parties to act, often involuntarily, just in anticipation to arbitration. To stimulate the voluntary bargaining process, the province of British Columbia (BC) introduced in 1993 a powerful mediation procedure prior to arbitration. The centerpiece of the BC …rst-contract model is non-binding mediation wherein the issued recommendations regarding the terms of the collective …rst agreement can be rejected by either party. Furthermore, mediation is bound by the replication principle. This implies that the mediator's objective is to replicate a collective bargaining agreement which re ‡ects as nearly as possible the collective bargaining agreement that conventional bargaining between the parties would have produced. Assessing the BC …rstcontract model, Vipond (2011) provides qualitative evidence on its success to resolve …rst-contract disputes voluntarily and to foster enduring bargaining relationships. Her interview data convey broad satisfaction on behalf of employers, unions, as well as mediators and arbitrators. Given its success and given the similarities between Canadian and US labor laws, an increasing number of policy makers and scholars consider the BC …rst-contract model viable for the US.
Until now, a discussion of the merits of …rst-contract mediation has been con…ned to the labor law literature. To the best of our knowledge, an economic analysis of the BC …rst-contract model has not yet been performed. This paper aims at …lling this gap. We present a theoretical framework which captures non-binding mediation under the replication principle. The mediator in our model is not an economic agent, who extracts part of the rents on the bargaining table. That would be in violation with the replication principle. The unique feature of our model is that mediation changes the structure of the non-cooperative bargaining game between the union and the …rm. Traditionally, it is common to model collective bargaining as a single alternating-o¤er bargaining game with exogenous breakdown probabilities in which all employed union members return to the external labor market when negotiations fail. Under mediation, both parties are free to engage in an arbitrary number of pairwise negotiations because recommendations -mimicking bargaining outcomes-are non-binding. Since contracts are non-binding, any number of dissatis…ed workers are free to quit and/or the …rm is free to dismiss any number of individual workers after each negotiation. Hence, non-binding mediation is modeled as a …nite sequence of alternating-o¤er bargaining games. We are looking for the mediation contract that is (i) non-wasteful, in the sense that all rents from production are divided between the union and the …rm, (ii) stable, in the sense that neither the union nor the …rm can respectively improve wages or pro…ts in further pairwise renegotiations and (iii) incentive compatible, in the sense that the employees'outside option constraint is not violated.
Our pronounced result is that …rst-contract mediation yields a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome. This result di¤ers from the two settings closest to ours in which unions and …rms negotiate over wages, i.e. collective bargaining under binding contracts and individual bargaining under non-binding contracts, which both yield Pareto ine¢ cient outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool does not a¤ect the wage-employment equilibrium under …rst-contract mediation. Finally, we provide a cooperative characterization of our results and demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and pro…ts coincide with the Owen values of the cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
We believe that our e¢ ciency result o¤ers a powerful economic foundation for the BC …rst-contract model. First-contract mediation proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring and the welfare gains associated with the optimal allocation of labor are substantial. These arguments provide a rationale for amending US …rst-contract legislation towards a stronger mediation-based approach.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 relates our analysis to traditional models of collective and individual worker-…rm bargaining. Section 3 derives the equilibrium mediation contract, shows that it is Pareto e¢ cient and investigates the role of a replacement pool. The cooperative characterization of equilibrium wages and pro…ts is provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Relation to existing literature
As a benchmark, consider a neoclassical (NC) (non-bargaining) …rm that writes binding contracts with its workers at the reservation wage. The properties of two binding equilibrium wage-employment contracts are widely known in the collective bargaining literature. The right-to-manage bargaining (RTM) model postulates that the union bargains with the …rm over wages (Nickell and Andrews, 1983 ). Compared to the NC …rm, underemployment emerges. The union and the …rm agree on a Pareto-ine¢ cient contract. To obtain Pareto e¢ ciency, the e¢ cient bargaining (EB) model requires that the union and the …rm negotiate simultaneously over wages and employment (McDonald and Solow, 1981) . Under the assumption of a risk-neutral union, the underemployment result of the RTM model disappears.
Stole and Zwiebel (SZ) (1996a, 1996b) formalize intra…rm wage bargaining between the …rm and its individual risk-neutral employees who are irreplaceable and cannot be contractually tied to the …rm. In equilibrium, the SZ …rm overhires relative to the NC …rm to such an extent that bargained wages are driven down to the reservation wage. Extending the SZ analysis, de Fontenay and Gans (FG) (2003) introduce an outside pool of ready-to-employ replacement workers. Such a …nite pool makes it no longer optimal for the …rm to overemploy. Moreover, insiders still capture a wage rent since losing an employee brings the …rm closer to running out of replacement workers. Therefore, the FG …rm underhires relative to the NC …rm. Whereas SZ and FG study individual wage bargaining in a non-binding contract setting, Westermark (2003) shows that in a binding contract setting individual wages are competitive and hence employment coincides with the NC …rm.
Our paper contributes to the collective bargaining literature by investigating how unionization a¤ects equilibrium wages and pro…ts under mediation, i.e. by changing the contract setting from binding to non-binding. Consistent with the SZ bargaining environment, our analysis enables to verify whether the SZ overemployment and the FG underemployment results are robust to unionization.
3 First-contract mediation
Model
We present a discrete version of the model, but results easily extend when labor is assumed to be continuous. Consider a …xed-size union of N 2 N members. A subset of n union members (the employees) work in the …rm. We assume that the union is su¢ ciently large to cover labor demand (n N ). We endogenize the choice of n later on. Wages are generically denoted by w. The reservation wage is w. We denotew(n) the employee's wage in our non-binding setting when there are n employees. The …rm utilizes a single asset, increasing and diminishing returns production function F (n) : N ! R + . We assume that F (i) iw for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng for reasons of incentive compatibility that will become clear later on. Denote F (n) F (n) F (n 1) the …rst di¤erence operator. The pro…t function is generically denoted by (n) : N ! R. The neoclassical …rm's pro…t function equals N C (n) F (n) nw. The …rm's pro…t function in this non-binding setting equals (n) F (n) nw(n). We denote the bargaining power of the union by 2 [0; 1].
We model …rst-contract mediation as an extensive-form bargaining game. The mediation technology proceeds as a …nite sequence of pairwise bargaining sessions over wages between the union and the …rm in the presence of a mediator. Bound by the replication principle, the mediator does not capture any rents on the bargaining table. Essential for our analysis is the assumption that the outcomes of these mediation sessions are nonbinding, i.e. there is no capability to bind either party to future wage and employment decisions. Hence, we allow the union and the …rm to engage in an arbitrary number of pairwise negotiations prior to production in which the union can costlessly re-open negotiations over the individual wages of its employed members with the …rm and vice versa. Such a renegotiation occurs when any number of dissatis…ed workers decide to quit and/or the …rm decides to dismiss any number of individual workers. We allow the union to renegotiate with the …rm on behalf of all remaining employees. An employee who returns to the external labor market can never re-enter the …rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. In Section 3.2, we assume that employees are irreplaceable. We relax the irreplaceability assumption in Section 3.3. We assume riskneutral employees with individual utilities equal to wages. Union preferences are represented by a utilitarian objective function. We assume generalized Nash bargaining. The bargaining scope is negotiation over wages alone.
The mediation game is presented in Figure 1 . Each mediation session is depicted by a box, representing the number of employees on which behalf the union is negotiating with the …rm. In the …rst mediation session, the union represents n employees. In each mediation session, either the union and the …rm reach an agreement (A), or negotiations break down (B). Whenever an agreement is reached, the game ends. Whenever a mediation session ends in a breakdown, one randomly chosen employee exits the game forever, after which bargaining starts again between the …rm and the union representing the remaining employees. 2 At most n mediation sessions can occur before the game terminates in which case all employees have dropped out following failed mediation sessions.
Within each mediation session, the mediator mimics the alternating-o¤er bargaining game of Binmore et al. (1986) in which there is an exogenous probability of breakdown following each rejected o¤er. Breakdown probabilities di¤er following a rejection by the …rm or the union. The game is described as follows. Starting with the …rm, the …rm and the union alternate wage proposals. If a proposal is accepted, negotiations terminate. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with probability p f if a rejection is made by the …rm and with probability p u if a rejection is made by the union. When a breakdown does not occur, the rejecting party makes a counterproposal. Proposals are made until one is accepted or a breakdown occurs. There is no discounting. It is straightforward to demonstrate that every bargaining power 2 [0; 1] is consistent for some pair of probabilities (p f ; p u ) in the following way:
We look for the limiting outcome as breakdown probabilities approach zero. Binmore et al. (1986) show that for such a bargaining session the generalized Nash bargaining solution emerges.
An e¢ ciency argument for …rst-contract mediation
We are looking for the mediation contract that is (i) non-wasteful, i.e. iw(i) +~ (i) = F (i) for all i n, (ii) stable, i.e. for any given bargaining power, neither the union nor the …rm can respectively improve wages or pro…ts in a pairwise renegotiation and (iii) incentive compatible with respect to w, i.e.w(i) w for all i n implying that the employees'outside option constraint is not violated.
Our main result is a powerful e¢ ciency argument for …rst-contract mediation. It is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. First-contract mediation yields a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome.
All proofs of the propositions are found in the Appendix.
We provide an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 1. The driving force behind the result is that equilibrium wages, pro…ts and employment of our …rst-contract mediation setting are equivalent to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of the binding EB setting. When a …rm bargains with a union in a non-binding mediation setting over wages alone, the …rm cannot anymore determine employment unilaterally afterwards. This is due to the stability requirement of the contract. Suppose that the union and the …rm agree upon a wagew(ñ ). However, assume that max n~ (n) = n 0 >ñ . The …rm chooses employment level n 0 , after which the union and the …rm want to renegotiatew(n 0 ), contradicting thatw(ñ ) was stable. In other words, although at the outset the union and the …rm bargain only over wages in a non-binding mediation setting, they implicitly have to reach a binding agreement on wages and employment in the end. The latter is exactly the objective of union-…rm bargaining in an EB framework.
The striking lesson that can be learned from this equivalence result is that starting from the RTM framework, a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome can be obtained by introducing mediation, i.e. changing the contract setting from binding to non-binding, instead of changing the bargaining scope from wages to wages and employment. This alternative route of reaching Pareto e¢ ciency is absent in standard labor economics textbooks that advocate changing the framework from RTM to EB.
Proposition 1 allows to investigate whether the SZ overemployment result is robust to a change in the labor organization from the individual to the collective level. The answer is negative since the optimal level of employment in our setting coincides with the one of an NC …rm. Hence, we obtain the following corollary. 
The role of a replacement pool
Until now, we have assumed that employees are irreplaceable. Alternatively, the union could deploy its union members outside the …rm to provide the …rm with a …nite ready-to-employ replacement pool. In what follows, we again assume that an employee who leaves the …rm can never return to the …rm and stays a union member earning the reservation wage. However, the …rm can now immediately draw upon the replacement pool to substitute the latter. The question in terms of application is whether …rms have such a replacement pool available. The answer is most likely a¢ rmative when untrained or low-skilled employees are involved. It is well documented that for such employees, negotiations with the …rm typically occur collectively rather than individually, making this setting most relevant. Proposition 2 challenges the role of a replacement pool under …rst-contract mediation.
Proposition 2. The availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool leaves the mediation contract unchanged.
We give an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 2. Suppose that for a given employment level n, the union and the …rm agree upon a wage scheme that negatively depends on the size of the replacement pool. Consider n employees and N n unionized ready-to-employ workers. In this case, the …rm wants to keep the replacement pool as large as possible in order to reduce the wage bill. However, the union has an incentive to deploy the replacement pool in order to increase the total sum of union members' wages. As a result, the wage scheme cannot be stable. A similar argument, where the incentives of the …rm and the union are reversed, holds when the wage scheme depends positively on the replacement pool.
Propositions 1 & 2 allow to answer the question whether the FG underemployment result is robust to a change in the labor organization from the individual to the collective level. The answer is negative since the presence of a replacement pool does not a¤ect the wage-employment equilibrium and the latter coincides with the binding EB equilibrium. First-contract mediation proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. Hence, we obtain the following corollary. 3 Corollary 2. Due to unionization, the FG underemployment result disappears under …rst-contract mediation.
A cooperative characterization of …rst-contract mediation
Since workers organize themselves in a union to negotiate with the …rm, we can analyze our mediation setting as a cooperative game. The goal of this section is to provide di¤erent cooperative characterizations of our equilibrium wages and pro…ts and show that they coincide with well-known solution concepts in cooperative game theory. 
The 2-player cooperative game
Before establishing a cooperative characterization of the mediation contract in the (n + 1)-player cooperative game, we …rst consider the 2-player cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v), denoting the …rm as 0 and the union consisting of n employees as 1. For this 2-player game, it holds that v (;) = v (0) = 0, v (1) = nw and v (0; 1) = F (n). 
We obtain Proposition 4. 
The (n + 1)-player cooperative game
The previous section allows for a characterization of equilibrium wages and pro…ts in terms of (weighted) Shapley values. Returning to the (n + 1)-player cooperative game (N; v), we obtain an alternative characterization in terms of modi…ed Shapley values, known as Owen values (Owen, 1977) , that takes into account possible coalitional structures that may form between players. The standard textbook interpretation of the Shapley value is that of a queue of players, where each player is entering a room and is obtaining her marginal contribution to the coalition of players already present in the room. In case of the Shapley value, all queues are formed with equal probability and the Shapley value is precisely the expected marginal contribution to coalitions with respect to this random order of players. In contrast, the Owen value restricts the possible formation of queues according to the coalitional structure. We formally de…ne a coalitional structure B = fS 1 ; : : : ; S m g which partitions N into m disjoint subsets. Let ! be a permutation on N and let be the set of all permutations on N . De…ne (B) as the subset of , which includes only the orders in which players of the same component of B appear successively; i.e. (B) = f! 2 : if i; j 2 S k and !(i) < !(l) < !(j), then l 2 S k g. Then, the Owen value assigns to each player her expected marginal contribution to the coalition of preceding players with respect to a uniform distribution over the set of orders in
In our framework, B = fS 1 ; S 2 g where S 1 = f0g is containing the …rm, and S 2 = f1; : : : ; ng is containing the workers.
We obtain Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. If the …rm's bargaining power equals 1 =2 , then workers' wages and the …rm's pro…t equal their Owen values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B.
Proposition 5 can be generalized for any bargaining power 2 [0; 1] in terms of "weighted" Owen values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B. However, to the best of our knowledge, the latter solution concept is not yet de…ned in the literature (for any coalitional structure B) and doing so goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, for our speci…c coalitional structure B, an elegant interpretation can be given which resembles Owen (1968)'s original interpretation of the weights of the weighted Shapley value as a measure of players'delay to reach the grand coalition. Owen showed that the introduction of weights amounts to distorting the equal probabilities with which queues form in the following way: the higher the weight of a player, the higher the probability of the queues in which this player arrives the last. In our setting with coalitional structure B and the …rm's bargaining power equal to 1=2, the …rm ends up at either end of the order with equal probability, yielding the Owen value of 1=2 times the …rm's marginal contribution to the grand coalition (remember that the marginal contribution of the …rm entering …rst equals zero). Generalizing, with coalitional structure B and the …rm's bargaining power equal to (1 ), the …rm's bargaining power exactly re ‡ects the probability that the …rm enters the last in the order of players, yielding the "weighted" Owen value of (1 ) times the …rm's marginal contribution to the grand coalition.
Conclusion
British Columbia's use of mediation to resolve negotiations of a …rst contract in a newly unionized workplace can provide important insights for labor law legislation reforms in the US. The cornerstone of BC's …rstcontract model is non-binding recommendations regarding the terms of the collective agreement under the mediator's objective to replicate conventional bargaining as close as possible. We show that the outcome of …rst-contract mediation is Pareto e¢ cient and coincides with the outcome of the binding e¢ cient bargaining framework. The availability and the size of a …nite replacement pool leave the mediation contract unchanged. These …ndings allow to conclude that the Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) First-contract mediation yields a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to show that equilibrium wages and pro…ts under …rst-contract mediation are equivalent to equilibrium wages and pro…ts under e¢ cient bargaining. Under utilitarian union preferences, the union's payo¤ when there are n employees equals nw(n) + (N n)w. The union's payo¤ when there are n 1 employees equals (n 1)w(n 1) + (N n + 1)w. Hence, the union's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals nw(n) (n 1)w(n 1) w. The …rm's net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals~ (n) ~ (n 1). The outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to max w [nw(n) (n 1)w(n 1) w] [~ (n) ~ (n 1)] 1 (1)
We derive the equilibrium contract inductively over the number of employees. Consider the case where only one employee is present. Let F (0) = 0. From the …rst-order condition of the logarithm of Eq. (1), we obtaiñ
Note thatw (1) is incentive compatible by assumption. Now consider the case where two employees are present. We obtain~
, F (2) 2w(2) +w(1) = 1 (2w(2) w(1) w)
,w(2) = 2 F (2) + 1 2w (1) + (1 ) 2 w ,w(2) = 2 [ F (2) + F (1)] + (1 )w
Note thatw (2) is incentive compatible by assumption. Generalizing the above argument over any n by induction, we obtain as the solution to the …rst-order di¤erence equation above the following expressions for w(n) and~ (n):w
Eqs.
(2) and (3) easily rewrite when directly using the production function rather than the marginal products:
and~
Note thatw(n) is incentive compatible by assumption. 4 From Eq. (5), it follows that the optimal employment level in our setting, denoted byñ , coincides with the optimal employment level of the neoclassical …rm, denoted by n N C .
Under EB, the outcome of the bargaining is the generalized Nash solution to
Maximization of Eq. (6) with respect to the wage and employment gives the following two …rst-order conditions respectively:
Solving Eqs. (7) and (8) simultaneously gives the expression for the contract curve: F (n) = w. Hence, the optimal level of employment under risk-neutral e¢ cient bargaining, denoted n EB , coincides with n N C and, as we just showed, withñ . From Eqs. (4) and (7), it follows thatw(ñ ) = w EB (n EB ). As a result, (ñ ) = EB (n EB ).
From induction over the number of unionized ready-to-employ workers, we obtain thatw N n (n) =w N n 1 (n) = : : : =w 1 (n) =w 0 (n). It is easy to check that the result holds for any number of employees, i.e.w N i (i) = w 0 (i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
Proof of proposition 3
If the …rm's bargaining power equals 1 =2 , then workers' wages equal the Shapley value of the union divided by the number of employees and the …rm's pro…t equals its Shapley value.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that~ (n) = 1 2 (F (n) nw) and nw(n) = 1 2 (F (n) + nw) are not the respective Shapley values of the …rm and the union in the cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v). Then, following Myerson (1980) , at least one of the following two conditions must be violated: (i) Balanced contributions: Sh 0 (f0; 1g ; v) Sh 0 (f0g ; v) = Sh 1 (f0; 1g ; v) Sh 1 (f1g ; v) or (ii) E¢ ciency: Sh 0 (f0; 1g ; v) + Sh 1 (f0; 1g ; v) = v (0; 1). It is straightforward that condition (ii) is satis…ed. Since Sh 0 (f0g ; v) = 0 and Sh 1 (f1g ; v) = nw, it follows that condition (i) is also satis…ed, thereby contradicting that~ (n) and nw(n) are not the Shapley values of the …rm and the union in the cooperative game (f0; 1g ; v).
Proof of proposition 4
Workers' wages equal the weighted Shapley value of the union divided by the number of employees and the …rm's pro…t equals its weighted Shapley value for any weight vector = ( 0 ; 1 ) where 0 0+ 1 = 1 and 1 0+ 1 = .
Proof. In our setting, f0g (v) = 0, f1g (v) = nw and f0;1g (v) = F (n) nw. When = ( 0 ; 1 ) where 0 0+ 1 = 1 and 1 0 + 1 = , the reader can check that Sh 0 (N; v; ) = (1 ) (F (n) nw) =~ (n) and Sh 1 (N; v; ) = nw + (F (n) nw) = F (n) + (1 )nw = nw(n).
Proof of proposition 5
If the …rm's bargaining power equals 1 =2 , then workers'wages and the …rm's pro…t equal their Owen values in the cooperative game with coalitional structure B = ff0g; f1; : : : ; ngg.
Proof. First, consider the …rm. Note that, given the coalitional structure B, the …rm enters either …rst or last in the order of players, implying that ( B) = 2n!. The marginal contribution of the …rm entering …rst equals 0, the marginal contribution of the …rm entering last equals F (n) nw. Hence, O 0 B; v = n! 2n! (F (n) nw) = 1 2 (F (n) nw) =~ (n). The result for the workers'wages follows by noting that (i) the cooperative game among workers when the …rm is absent is inessential, implying that O i B; v = O j B; v for all i; j 2 S 2 and that (ii) Owen values satisfy e¢ ciency with respect to the grand coalition, implying that 
